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ORIGIN 

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SUPPLEMENT

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1. In the past two years the Russian language has become extremely popular among the Chinese intelligentsia and Shanghai student circles. Hundreds of students started studying Russian and got Russian teachers without thought of their political beliefs. Many of these teachers were Russian emigrants, mostly women, who were not Soviet subjects. This fact was ignored by Shanghai Soviet authorities until the arrival of Rogov, who advised Soviet subjects to take jobs as teachers of Chinese youth.
2. Recently a special committee was formed within the TASS agency as a result of a verbal order from Ambassador A. Petrov. The committee is headed by Rogov and some of the members are as follows:
 - L.V. Grosse, poet, journalist, fluent speaker of Chinese, English, French, German and Italian; active member of the Shanghai office of TASS, and son of the former Imperial Russian Consul-General in Shanghai.
 - V. Rublev, expert Chinese linguist, formerly secretary of the Soviet Citizens Club in Shanghai and now in the Chinese section of TASS.
 - Klimenko, Chinese language expert, member of Torgpred and one of the leading "activists".
 - Zakheim, publisher and editor of the Chinese-Russian weekly magazine, Epoch, and one of the important Soviet links between Chinese and Soviet journalists in Shanghai.
3. The function of this committee, as formulated by Rogov, is to supervise teaching Chinese youth the Russian language, Soviet literature, history, economics, and social political doctrines. The committee's plan of action is as follows:
 - (1) To register and prepare as politically conscious teachers, those Soviet subjects who speak fluent Chinese and who are intelligent enough to be trained.
 - (2) To approach Chinese universities, colleges, art and music institutions, newspapers, magazines, etc. with an offer of Russian language teachers for moderate fees with the guarantee of the Soviet Bureau of Trade (?). This offer should be advertized in the Chinese vernacular papers.
 - (3) To form special courses for groups of five or ten to meet in private houses with special allowances for renting rooms to be paid for by TASS.
 - (4) To use Chinese employees working for official, public or private Soviet institutions to recruit Chinese pupils.
 - (5) To work out a special course of study for the Chinese pupils and to report regularly on the progress of their study.
 - (6) To recommend that the Chinese pupils come in contact with selected Soviet families and girls as a part of their training in the Russian language.

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-2-

4. In addition to this plan, TASS has intensified work with specially formed Chinese literary circles for the translation into Chinese of Soviet literature; TASS pays for the printing. This work started in the autumn of 1946 under the pretext of giving to the Chinese masses examples of the classics of Pushkin on the occasion of the reopening of the Pushkin Monument on the corner of Route Michon and Route Chisi. The translation work has now extended to include the writings of Soviet authors on political, economic, social and trade union subjects.
5. The whole plan is designed to camouflage the daily contacts between Chinese and Soviets in order to avoid any interference by Chinese anti-communist elements. The Soviets are preparing to organize Chinese youth to prepare for future political changes in China.
6. Members of the new committee consider the present time most important to gain power among Chinese pro-Soviet and Chinese Communist groups. These members expect that:
 - (1) In the forthcoming elections in China, a mass of agitators and a well-prepared organization will be required to sponsor as many Chinese Communists or pro-Communist Chinese as possible for election.
 - (2) The social, political, and economic degradation of China under the present government will soon end in a collapse.
 - (3) The conflict over China between the USSR and the United States is inevitable and the Soviets must rely on support from the Chinese masses, led by well-prepared and dynamic minorities.
 - (4) Trade unions, students, the intelligentsia, newspapers and political parties must more or less fall into the organized control of Soviet shadow agents.
7. The anti-American and anti-foreign sentiments of Chinese youth will now be exploited to the utmost by the Soviets. The Soviets will try to fill the vacuum among Chinese youth which was created after VJ Day when neither American nor any other foreign interests paid any attention to winning the sympathy of Chinese youth. Already the American YCA in Shanghai is "under Soviet control" as most of the Russian and Jewish youths who hold positions in the institution belong to the pro-Soviet group.
8. Soviet experts on China know the Chinese character well. The older generation of Chinese is and was passive. Chinese youth is usually active, dynamic and easily aroused; in the case of important political trouble, the Chinese youth will lead not only those Chinese who already are well-organized in trade unions but the old passive generation as well.

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Note: CHEN Chia-k'ang, Chinese Communist spokesman in Shanghai until 8 March 1947, expressed the same analysis of Chinese youth, particularly the students and suggested the possible exploitation of their nationalistic spirit to the benefit of the Communist cause.)

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